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WIM B. G. LIEBRAND
University of Groningen
The Netherlands
Many important human decisions occur in settings in which there
is a strong interdependence between one's own and others' out-
comes. In such instances an actor's decision affects both the
actor's outcomes and those of other persons. Common examples
of such social interdependence can be found in making decisions
in such diverse issues as beginning or ending interpersonal rela-
tionships, the procreation of children, pollution control man-
agement, and the use of commonly owned resources such as fresh
water supplies and fossil fuels. An important subclass of interde-
pendence situations is found in those settings in which persons, by
pursuing immediate self-interest, can harm their own group's
interest (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Platt, 1973). These situations
have been called 'social traps' (Platt, 1973), `tragedy of the com-
mons' (Hardin, 1968), '1/ Nth situations' (Meux, 1973), and
`social dilemmas' (Dawes, 1975). In the present research, the term
`social dilemmas' will be used.
Social dilemmas have been defined by Dawes (1975) as situa-
tions in which (1) each person has availabie a dominating stra-
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tegy, i.e., one that yields the person the best payoff in all circum-
stances; and (2) the collective choice of dominating strategies
results in a deficient outcome, that is, a result that is less preferred
by all persons than the result that would have occurred if all had
not chosen their dominating strategy. Dawes's requirement of a
dominating strategy (1975,1980) for each person does not appear
to be crucial for considering a situation a social dilemma. What is
critical is that a strategy can be chosen that ultimately results in
an outcome that is deficient for all persons involved, and that
nonetheless can be attractive since in some circumstances that
strategy yields the best payoff for the person choosing it.
Relaxing the dominance assumption enables one to evaluate
more situations that have the psychological characteristics of
social dilemmas. For this reason, in the present research á
broader definition of the concept of social dilemma is formulated
and employed. Here a social dilemma is defined as a situation in
which (1) there is a strategy that yields the person the best payoff
in at least one configuration of strategy choices and that has a
negative impact on the interests of the other persons involved,
and (2) the choice of that particular strategy by all persons results
in a deficient outcome. The latter definition still has the advan-
tage of being based on comparison of payoffs only within an
individual (Dawes, 1980). It differs from Dawes's definition in
that, instead of the dominant strategy that yields the best payoff in
all circumstances, a strategy is employed that (depending upon
others' choices) might yield the best payoff; it matches Dawes's
definition in that the choosing of that very strategy does not have
negative consequences for others, and ultimately will result in a
deficient outcome for all.
The parallelism between n-person games and social dilemmas
has been noted frequently (Brechner, 1977; Dawes et al., 1974;
Edney and Harper, 1978; Kelley and Grzelak, 1972; Kahan, 1974;
Messick, 1973). Moreover, some n-person game classifications
have been proposed (Dawes, 1980; Goehring and Kahan, 1976;
Komorita, 1976; Weil, 1966). The present study attempts to
extend this line of research by investigating which game settings
are capable of capturing the essence of the social dilemma struc-
ture as defined above. Drawing heavily on the work of Ham-
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burger (1973, 1974), all two-person two-alternative games pos-
sessing social dilemma properties will be selected. Next, based on
the two-person social dilemma games, a classification of n-person
social dilemma games is proposed. And finally, it will be shown
that the present classification extends earlier classification
schemel.
TWO-PERSON TWO-ALTERNATIVE GAMES
WITH SOCIAL DILEMMA PROPERTIES
In the so-called 2 x 2 games, each of two players has to choose,
privately, one of two alternatives. The consequences to each
player of each possible combination of choices, specified in the
payoff matrix of the game, are known to both players in advance.
The strategic properties of different types of 2 x 2 games can be
analyzed by comparing the payoff matrices of the games.
The number of different 2 x 2 games that can be constructed is
infinite. Therefore, following Rapoport and Guyer (1966), some
restrictions are introduced. First, the present analysis is based
upon the preference ordering of the four payoffs as they appear to
the one and to the other player. Second, it is supposed that each
player has a strict preference ordering of the four possible
payoffs. Given the two restrictions, there still are 4! x 4! = 576
ways to fill up the payoff matrix. After eliminating games that are
invariant up to an interchange of rows and/ or columns and/ or
players, there are 78 nonequivalent 2 x 2 games possible (Rapo-
port and Guyer, 1966). In this section a subclass of these nonequi-
valent 2 x 2 games will be considered. This subclass consists of
games that are symmetrical—that is, games that "look the same"
to both players (Harris, 1969: 139)—that possess the two social
dilemma properties described previously. As is shown below,
there are only three 2 x 2 game formats conforming to these
requirements.
Setting aside the attractiveness restriction for a moment, the
first social dilemma property is tantamount to the availability of a
strategy having negative consequences for the other person. This
property reduces the number of potentially relevant games to
those games in which both players have a most-threatening stra-
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tegy. A strategy is called most-threatening if a rational player 1
prefers player 2 not to choose that strategy, irrespective of player
l's choice. In such a case player 2 has a most-threatening strategy
(Hamburger, 1973, 1974). Following Hamburger's (1974) method
of proof, it is easily seen that there are exactly six symmetrical
games in which each player has the choice between strategy A and
the most-threatening strategy B.
First, a player's strict preference ordering of the four payoffs is
labeled 4, 3, 2, 1 in decreasing order of preference. Then the
payoffs to each player can be distributed into the four cells of the
payoff matrix in such a way that the outcome to player 1 is always
stated first in a cell. Next, without reducing the number of 78
nonequivalent 2 x 2 games, it is possible to put player 1's most-
threatening strategy in the second row, and player 2's most-
threatening strategy in the second column. Given this strategy
configuration, it follows that the payoffs to player 1 in the left
column must be higher than his or her payoffs in the right column.
Therefore, payoff 4 to player 1 can appear only in two outcome
cells; the other payoff to player 1 in the same row can be either 3,
2, or 1. After assigning two payoffs in this way, the other payoffs
to player 1 are uniquely determined. Consequently, a total of 6
different payoff configurations to player 1 can be distinguished.
Finally, out of the 6 (player 1) x 6 (player 2) = 36 payoff matrices,
only the six symmetrical matrices have to be considered. These six
matrices are shown in Table 1.
Having a most-threatening strategy thus reduces the number ot
2 x 2 games to be considered to six. However, Social Dilemma
property 1 furthermore implies that this most-threatening strat-
egy has to be attractive to at least one rational player. Here,
strategy B is considered to be potentially attractive if, for at least
one pair of strategy choices, strategy B yields the best payoff to at
least one player. In other words, all the payoff matrices in which
strategy A is a dominant strategy have to be eliminated. In Tabie 1
this affects matrices 5 and 6.
Finally, Social Dilemma property 2 eliminates the game
depicted in matrix 4. In two-person settings, property 2 states that
both players are better off if both choose A than if both choose B.
Since the pair of outcomes resulting from both players choosing B
is higher than the outcomes resulting from an A choice by both
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TABLE 1










A A3 , 3 1	, 4
4 , 1 2 , 2
Matrix 1
3 , 3 2 , 4
4 , 2 1 ,	1
Matrix 2
4 , 4 1	, 3
3 ,	1 2 , 2
Matrix 3
A B A A B
A
B
A2 , 2 1	, 4
4 , 1 3 , 3
Matrix 4
4 , 4 2 . 3
3 , 2 1,1
Matrix 5
4 , 4 3 , 2




NOTE: Alternative B is each player's most-threatening strategy. Entries are pre-
ference orderings (4 = best possible outcome; 1 = worst possible outcome). ,First
entry refers to player 1, second is player 2; player 1 is row player, and player 2 is
column player.
players, the restriction imposed by property 2 is not fulfilled in
matrix 4.
Out of the three symmetrical 2 x 2 games with social dilemma
properties, matrix 1 and matrix 2 have undergone extensive
experimental investigation. Matrix 1 is the well-known Prisoner's
Dilemma Game (Luce and Raiffa, 1956); matrix 2 is known as
Chicken (Kahn, 1965). The game depicted in matrix 3, labeled by
Rapoport and Guyer (1966, :209) as a trivial no-conflict game, is
not very well known. For present , purposes matrix 3 will be
labeled the "Trust Game."
THE DECISIONAL STRUCTURE OF
THE PRISONER'S, THE CHICKEN
AND THE TRUST SOCIAL DILEMMAS
The following anecdote, taken from Luce and Raiffa (1956),
illustrates both the name and the social dilemma properties of the
Prisoner's Dilemma. Two individuals, accused of robbing a bank,
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are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney,
unable to prove that they are guilty, confronts each prisoner with
two alternatives: to confess to the crime (Alternative B), or not to
confess to it (Alternative A). If both suspects confess, each will
receive a five-year sentence. If neither suspect confesses, both will
be convicted on some minor charge and receive a one-month
sentence. If one confesses and the other does not, the suspect who
does not confess will receive a ten-years'sentence, while the other
will be set free. The consequences associated with the four possi-
ble combinations of choices are such that they result in the
preference orderings depicted in matrix 1 (Table 1). The ordering
for each prisoner is strict, ranging from 1 (worst outcome: ten-
year sentence) to 4 (best outcome: freedom). As appears from the
preference orderings, it is to each prisoner's advantage to confess,
regardless of the other's choice. However, if both prisoners act in
their own interest and confess, they both end up in a worse
position (five-year sentence) than in the case in which they do not
confess (one-month sentence). The Prisoner's Dilemma is an
example of a mixed-motive game, there is a motive to cooperate
(A: not confess), and there is the incompatible motive to defect
(B: confess). The specific ordering of payoffs as depicted in
matrix 1 results in two important properties of the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game. First, each player has a dominating strategy.
Second, if both players choose their dominant strategy, which is
prescribed by the principle to maximize the payoff or the princi-
ple to maximize the minimum payoff (maximin), a deficient
outcome results.
The term "Chicken" (matrix 2) applies to a game that is,
according to Broeze (1971), popular among American teenagers.
Two young Americans are sitting in a fast-driving car. The driver
takes his hands off the steering wheel. The "chicken" is the one
first taking the steering wheel (A-alternative), thereby giving the
other the highest payoff. However, the joint disaster, or the worst
outcome for both results from a joint refusal to steer again.
In contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, in Chicken the most-
threatening strategy is not a dominating strategy. In Chicken the
most-threatening strategy B is the strategy to be selected by
players trying to get the highest payoff (maximax principle). In
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both Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken a double B-choice results
in a deficient outcome. Only in Chicken, however, is this deficient
outcome the worst possible outcome.
Finally, the following anecdote illustrates the decisional struc-
ture of the Trust Game. In order to decide which one is the best
long-distance runner, two athletes plan to run a marathon. Both
prefer an honest race to a race in which one or both of them are
using a drug (alternative B). However, given that the other is
going to use dope, each prefers to use dope so as to avoid being at
a disadvantage in the race.
The most-threatening strategy B (i.e., to use drugs) is not a
dominating strategy in the Trust Game. Choosing B, however,
clearly is prescribed by the well-known strategy to maximize the
minimum payoff (maximin principle). Doing so results in a defi-
cient outcome for both players.
FROM MATRICES TO GRAPHS
To represent payoffs in three- or more-person games in the
same way as was done for 2 x 2 games, a three- or more-
dimensional matrix would be required. To avoid these cumber-
some matrices, a graphic representation is used in Figure 1 to
illustrate the three games discussed above.
Again the B-alternative corresponds to the most-threatening
strategy, the A-alternative to the common-interest strategy. The
number of players choosing alternative A is depicted on the
horizontal axis; the two payoff graphs for each game refer to the
payoffs for a player choosing either A or B, given a particular
total number of A-choices. The correspondence betwen matrices
1 and 3 (Table 1) and graphs 1 and 3 (Figure 1) can be seen by
comparing the payoff orderings. On the one hand the payoff
orderings are presented by the matrix cell entries, on the other
hand they are presented by the end points of the graphs. For
example, in Prisoner's Dilemma (matrix 1; graph 1), the payoff
graph for choosing B includes the highest payoff (4) and lies in all
circumstances (0, 1, or 2 A-choices) above the graph for choosing
A. However, the end point representing the payoff for both, in
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FROM TWO-PERSON TO N-PERSON GAMES
In turning from two-person to three- or more-person games,
some distinctive characteristics are introduced (Dawes, 1980).
First, in two-person games there is one opponent, choosing either
A or B, so that each player knows with certainty how the other has
behaved from the payoff received. In n-person games this identi-
Liebrand / SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES
	 131
fication is impossible. As long as not all the other players make
the same choice, all personal choices remain secret. Second, the
influence of one individual's choice on the other's payoff—called
the "externality" (Buchanan, 1971; Schelling, 1973)—is spread
out over a considerable number of players. By contrast, in two-
person games, negative or positive externalities are focused; they
directly punish or reward the other player.
The increased anonymity and the greater spread of externali-
ties do not alter the decision structure in the three types of social
dilemmas. They may lower the threshold for choosing the most-
threatening strategy, constituting thereby (compared to the two-
person version) an even more-threatening situation. Thus,
regarding the parallelism between the decision structure of the
two-person and the n-person games, the three 2 x 2 games with
social dilemma properties provide a useful classification for n-
person social dilemma games. In the following, three real-life
examples are used to illustrate the payoff graphs of the three types
of n-person social dilemma games. In order to simplify the anal-
ysis, the choices of subgroups consisting of 1/4 n persons are
considered to be equal. Consequently, the payoff graphs are
defined in case 4/ 4 n, 3/ 4 n, 2/ 4 n, 1/ 4 n, or 0 persons have chosen
alternative A.
Prisoner's Social Dilemma
The decision to pollute may be described by the Prisoner's
Social Dilemma payoff graphs in Figure 2 (Dawes et al., 1974;
Goehring and Kahan, 1976). Pollution problems can be found at
various levels of decision-making, ranging from individuals to
nations. For example, at the industrial level, no matter what other
chemical industries may do to get rid of their chemical waste, it is
cheaper to have the waste dumped at some rubbish dump or,
alternatively, in the ocean, than to take care of an adequate
decomposition of waste. The ultimate long-term consequences of
this selfish act have to be shared by all individuals. At the individ-
ual level the slogan "every litter bit hurts" nicely reflects the
negative externalities accompanying the decision to pollute
(alternative B). Though all individuals would like to avoid the
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long-term negative consequences, it remains cheaper and simpler
for them to keep polluting as anonymous individuals. The payoff
graph for polluting lies for its entire length above the graph
indicating the payoff for not polluting.
Chicken Social Dilemma
In the process of deciding whether to go by bike (alternative A)
or by car (alternative B), an individual trying to get to work as fast
as possible is facing a Chicken Social Dilemma. In this type of
social dilemma the payoff for choosing either A or B strongly
depends upon the number of others deciding to go by bike (A). If
hardly anybody goes by bike, there will be many cars on the road,
and consequently there will be traffic jams. That being so, our
decision maker is better off going by bike than by car. In graph 2
(Figure 2) this situation is reflected to the left of the intersection,
where the payoff graph for alternative A lies above the one for
alternative B. Instead of going by bike, the same person is better
off going by car if many people decide to go by bike; to the right
of the intersection the payoff for alternative A becomes less and
less attractive. In case everybody decides to go by car the worst
possible outcome for all occurs. The accumulation of the nega-
tive externalities is then expressed in congestion and polluted air.
In that case each person would prefer a situation in which neither
of them would use a car.
Trust Social Dilemma
There are times at which a good supply is not excessive but
sufficient. Any initiation of hoarding, however, generates a Trust
Social Dilemma. Clearly the highest payoff results from no
hoarding at all (alternative A). Not hoarding food—for example,
milk—provides no additional costs for preservation while there is
enough milk available in the stores. If only a small number of
persons are keeping a lot of milk in reserve, one is better off not
hoarding milk. In graph 3 (Figure 2) this is reflected by the payoff
graphs to the right of the intersection. But if the number of
persons hoarding milk increases, the attractiveness of one's own
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hoarding increases. At the end, thanks to the massive hoarding
there will be no more milk available in the stores. Consequently,
in that case the worst possible payoff accrues to the person who
had chosen alternative A.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES
Most n-person game classifications consider the Prisoner's
Dilemmas. Typically, an n-person two-alternative prisoner's
Dilemma (n > 2) is defined by the following:
	
B(j - 1) > AO)
	
j = 1, 2 . . ., n	 [1]
	
A(n) > B(0)	 [2]
where the index within parentheses represents the number of
A-choices; B(j) is the payoff to each player choosing B, given the
total of j A-choices; and A(j) is the payoff for choosing A in that
case.
Weil (1966) suggested a categorization based on the algebraic
sign of [A(j) - A(j - 1)] on the one hand, and [B(j) - B(j - 1)] on the
other hand. Together with the assumption that all members of the
set [A(j) - A(j - 1)] and the set [B(j) - B(j - 1] are alike with respect
to algebraic sign, and the restriction that j is not equal to n, four
cases can be distinguished: Positive-Positive, Positive-Negative,
Negative-Positive, and Negative-Negative. Both Weil (1966) and
Goehring and Kahan (1976) consider the Positive-Positive case
the one in which most applications to the real world can be
found.
Goehring and Kahan further subdivided Weil's Positive-
Positive case, or those games having payoff functions increasing
with the number of A-choices, into three types of Prisoner's
Dilemma games. Type 1 and type 2 consist of those games having
payoff functions whereby [B(j - 1) - A(j)] increases or decreases
with the total number of A-choices, respectively. Type 3 in Goeh-
ring and Kahan's classification consists of those games having
linear parallel payoff functions. They designate this type of game
the "uniform" Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Dawes made a further subdivision of the uniform Prisoner's
Dilemma. Following Hamburger (1973), he distinguished "take
some" and "give some" games. The difference between the two
games lies in the procedures used: In take some, one can take
some from others, and in give some, one can contribute to a
common good. In addition to these uniform games, Dawes's
classification of social dilemma games consists of "variabie
games," or games that, because of their complicated rules and
regulations, defy a simple mathematical description of the payoff
configuration (e.g., Rubenstein et al., 1975).
All the above classifications are based on Prisoner's Dilemmas
conforming to specific requirements. In addition to these classifi-
cations, one more model of n-person games has been proposed.
Komorita (1976: 358) defined n-person dilemmas rather uncon-
ventionally; he defined the essential conditions as follows:
(1) Each of n persons has two choices, cooperative (A) or com-
petitive (B).
(2) The outcomes for both choices increase monotonically with
the proportion of people who make the cooperative choice.
(3) The competitive choice always yields a higher outcome than
the cooperative choice.
(4) The outcome if everyone makes a cooperative choice is
greater than the outcome if everyone makes a competitive
choice.
Next Komorita (1976: 359-360) stated that "the essential condi-
tion that the B-choice dominates the A-choice implies that...
B(j) > A(j)." In defining the concept of dominance in this way, it is
possible that B(j) > A(j), which is becoming the (j - 1) + lst
A-chooser, yields a higher payoff than the B choice would afford
in that case. This very payoff configuration does not satisfy the
Prisoner's Dilemma requirements. On the other hand, given a
Prisoner's Dilemma, Komorita's condition B(j) > A(j) is true.
Consequently, Komorita's model captures more types of games
than just the Prisoner's Dilemma. In addition, Komorita pro-
posed an index of cooperation (K*) based on Rapoport's (1967)
index for the two-person Prisoner's Dilemma. K* is defined by
Komorita as
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A(n) - B(0) / 0(max) - 0(min)
where 0(max) and 0(min) denote the maximum and minimum
possible outcomes. The index K* then serves to distinguish
different types of n-person dilemma games. However, K* can
take the same value given two different types of n-person games.
For example, consider the Chicken Social Dilemma and the
Trust Social Dilemma depicted in Figure 1. If the payoff graphs
represent numerical values ranging from 4 to 1, then K* equals
(3-1)/ (4-1) for the Chicken Dilemma and (4-2)/ (4-1) for the Trust
Dilemma. Taking into account the insensitiveness of K* for
different payoff structures, in the present research Komorita's
model is not considered a useful model for classifying n-person
dilemma games.
As was stated previously, the present classification extends the
above classifications in that it consists of three different types of
social dilemma games, based on an exhaustive set of 2 x 2 games.
It consists of the Prisoner's Social Dilemma, of which no further
subdivision is provided, the Chicken Social Dilemma, and the
Trust Social Dilemma. Until now, empirical research has been
focused on the Prisoner's Social Dilemma (Dawes et al., 1977;
Caldwell, 1976; Kelley and Grzelak, 1972) and the Chicken
Social Dilemma (Meux, 1973). However, there seems to be no
apparent reason to exclude the Trust Social Dilemma from n-
person game research.
DISCUSSION
Social dilemmas were defined as situations in which, by the
very act of choosing a strategy with negative externalities, the
ultimate outcome can be called deficient. Starting from Rapo-
port and Guyer's (1966) taxonomy of nonequivalent 2 x 2 games,
it has been shown that exactly three of these games possess the
social dilemma properties as defined. Next, it appeared that the
decision structure underlying different real-life situations can be
properly captured by the n-person generalizations of the three 2 x
2 social dilemma games.
The payoff configuration for the three types of social dilemmas
provides insight into the reasons for behaving in such a way that a
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deficient collective outcome results. Not choosing the dominant
strategy with negative externalities in a Prisoner's Social Dilemma
is called an irrational way of behaving. Two other "rational”
ways of behaving or selection principles can be distinguished
(Hamburger, 1979: 42). The principle of maximizing the maxi-
mum payoff and the principle of maximizing the minimum
payoff both prescribe the decision to choose the strategy with
negative externalities, in a Chicken Social Dilemma and a Trust
Social Dilemma, respectively. So, in all three types of social
dilemmas the behavior that is not in the service of the common
interest is prescribed by the above selection principles. It follows
that the most likely outcome is the deficient outcome. Hence, the
development of solutions to avoid the deficient outcomes can be
called the most important task of the social dilemma paradigm.
The three types of n-person social dilemma games provide a
promising research tool for the development of such solutions.
The social dilemma mechanism can be captured in laboratory
analogues. It is a common observation, that in such instances
subjects do take the decision task extremely serious (Bonacich,
1976; Dawes et al., 1977, Liebrand, 1982). For example:
One of the most significant aspects of this study, however, did not
show up in the data analysis. It is the extreme seriousness with which
the subjects take the problems. Comments such as, "If you defect on
the rest of us, you're going to live with it the rest of your life," were
not at all uncommon. Nor was it unusual for people to wish to leave
the experimental building by the back door, to claim that they did
not wish to see the "sons of bitches" who double-crossed them, to
become extremely angry at other subjects, or to become tearful.
However, in employing games as a research tool oné signifi-
cant problem is the way in which the payoff matrix as presented
by the experimenter is actually experienced by the subjects. Kel-
ley and Thibaut (1978) pointed out that the outcome matrix
presented by an experimenter, which may be described as the
"given" matrix, may not be the one on which the decisions of the
actors are based. Rather, actors may transform the outcomes in a
given matrix into utilities according to the personal values they
place on the alternative outcome distributions their choices
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would afford themselves and other persons (Harris, 1969; Kelley
and Thibaut, 1978; McClintock, 1972). Kelley and Thibaut des-
cribed this process as one of moving from a "given" to an "effec-
tave" matrix.
In the present study it was assumed throughout that each
player has a strict preference-ordering of the outcomes, or alter-
natively, that matrix cell entries represent player's utilities. Given
these utilities each person faces the same type of dilemma. How-
ever, it follows that differentially transforming the numerical
outcomes in the cells of the given matrix affects the structure of
the game accordingly. For example, suppose that the numerical
outcomes in matrix 1 (Table 1) represent money instead of utili-
ties. The Prisoner's Dilemma structure, evident for a person
focused on payoffs to self, is then absent for a person trying to
maximize the other's payoff (altruism). A fortiori, such a dollar
representation of either matrix 1, matrix 2, or matrix 3 (Table 1),
would not generate a social dilemma at all, if all persons were
more concerned with the payoff to others than with their own
payoff. Such a case, however, is considered strictly hypothetical
here. Reality forces us to believe that most persons are more
concerned with their own payoff than with others' payoff. Con-
sequently, social dilemmas can be observed everywhere.
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